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Abstract: China’s major imbalances include trade and capital account surpluses and a large 
annual build-up of international reserves. China has a capital account surplus reinforcing the 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, mainly U.S. dollar-denominated assets.  Usually, a 
sustainable fixed or floating exchange rate system requires that a country with a large current 
account surplus run a capital account deficit. The U.S. is widely criticized for having a comparable 
trade deficit that mirrors, to a large extent, China’s surplus and for its dependence on large 
capital inflows including from China. There is political pressure for protectionism and for China to 
implement wasteful economic policies to reduce the surplus. 
 Negative consequences of China’s imbalances include the build-up of large, low-return 
foreign exchange, leading to rapid growth in money and credit and to a sharp acceleration in 
inflation. Moreover, efforts to offset money growth and inflation have deepened inefficiencies in 
the financial system, which China had hoped to remedy by its efforts to recapitalize and list its 
banks’ equities on stock exchanges. China could eliminate these imbalances by policies that 
would reduce growth. One solution is to lift restrictions on capital outflows, allowing households 
and business to diversify their wealth holdings and realize higher returns and/or less volatility in 
their income and wealth.  This would transform future asset growth to holdings of higher return, 
lower risk assets abroad and also would eliminate pressures on the People’s Bank of China, 
allowing for more rapid deregulation of banks, slower money and credit growth and lower 
inflation. The U.S. is already adjusting to these imbalances as the current account deficit began 
to decline in 2005 and the dollar has fallen dramatically. Unfortunately, such adverse 
developments are coming from political pressures to raise taxes, especially on capital resources 
income, and from protectionist policies, both of which are slowing growth in the U.S.   
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Imbalances in China and U.S. Capital Flows 
John A. Tatom  
 
U.S. and Chinese economic relations are principal components of each country’s 
international transactions with the rest of the world. But these transactions are not 
balanced for either country and potential imbalances in their respective international 
transactions could have important effects on their economic performance and growth 
possibilities, and could create significant geopolitical issues for each country. 
International trade in goods and services attracts the most attention, with the U.S. running 
a large and persistent current account deficit, while China runs a large surplus.1  More to 
the point, China is a very important source of U.S. imports and accounts for a large share 
of the U.S. current account imbalance, while the U.S. is an important market for China’s 
exports, and hence accounts for a large share of China’s current account surplus.  
Whether these trade balances constitute imbalances is open to question, but proposed 
remedies are commonplace.   
 
But international trade is not simply about goods and services.  Capital flows are a large 
and perhaps more significant aspect of a country’s international relations and typically 
provide the mirror image of a country’s balance on trading goods and services.  More 
importantly, capital flows can have a more important effect on economic activity and on 
economic growth.  Capital inflows are an important source of financing for domestic 
investment activities and the ‘direct” component of capital inflows often bring with them 
not only the investments in productivity that are financed, but also productive 
entrepreneurial, organizational and management skills.  Capital outflows provide a source 
of profitable business expansion for domestic firms, accessing new markets, technologies 
and resources, and for investors (consumers, business and government) who gain access 
to new financial products, better rates of return or lower risk on financial assets. 
 
In the case of the U.S. and China, both countries are relatively open, but there are large 
differences in the openness and role of their capital transactions in each country.  The 
U.S. is very open and because of its advantages as a relatively free market and 
technology and productivity leader among developed nations, it attracts a relatively large 
share of global capital, and its capital outflows are also relatively large.  The most 
significant point is that net capital inflows finance the imports and current account deficit 
that attract so much political attention in the United States and the demand for U.S. 
dollars to finance the acquisition of U.S. assets often drives the balance of payments and 
the value of the dollar. More importantly, the U.S. has a fluctuating exchange rate so that 
the net capital surplus in its transactions, (called a capital account surplus here) finances 
the current account deficit, the excess of U.S. imports of goods, services and resource 
services over its exports.   
 
In China, capital inflows are also open and are large relative to gross domestic product 
(GDP). In the past few years, capital outflows from China have been sizable, but have 
                                                 
1 The current account refers to Balance of Payments accounting where the current account measures the 
exports (credit, +) and imports (debit, -) of goods, services, income payments for resource services and 
unilateral international transfers. 
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fallen short of the capital inflow, so that China has persistently had a net capital inflow to 
go along with its current account surplus.  To maintain the exchange rate, which would 
otherwise appreciate the value of domestic currency, the yuan, the People’s Bank of 
China has had to acquire the excess funds flowing into the currency and hold it as official 
reserve assets, principally in U.S. Treasury securities, or other foreign currency assets. 
Because of the large surpluses, China has been under international pressure, especially 
from the United States, to appreciate the value of its currency, in order to change trade 
and investor behavior to eliminate the surpluses in their international accounts.   
 
Generally China’s so-called imbalances—a large current account surplus,  a capital 
account surplus and a large annual accumulation of foreign exchange or official reserve 
assets generally—have been viewed as problems for their trading partners and for their 
consumers.  There are similar popular sentiments among many analysts and policymakers 
in the U.S. about the relatively large U.S. current account deficit and about the increasing 
amount of government debt being accumulated abroad, especially in China.  This article 
provides some perspective on these problems, how they are related and some potential 
remedies.  The focus here is on the respective capital account imbalances and how they 
might be used to restore some balance to each country’s international payments accounts. 
But first, in Section I the trade situation is reviewed to set the stage for the discussion.  
Section II focuses on the capital account in each country and Section III provides a 
discussion of some potential remedies to imbalances. Section IV provides a summary and 
some concluding remarks.   
    
I. The China and U.S. Trade Imbalances 
The U.S. and China have relatively large current account balances, with China having 
perhaps the largest surplus and the U.S. a deficit.  Table 1 shows the current account 
balance of each country for 2007, measured in U.S. dollars and as a percent of each 
country’s GDP, as well as the contribution of each countries trade to the others measures.   
 
Table 1 
Current account components of the Balance of Payments 
U.S. and China Balance of Payments, 2007                                                                                                                    
(Billions of U.S. dollars) China % GDP U.S. share % of total U.S. %GDP China share % of total
Current account balance $371.8 11.5% $289.7 77.9% -$738.6 -5.3% -$289.7 39.2%
Exports of goods and service 1344.2 41.4 330.5 24.6 1628.4 11.8 79.3 4.9
Imports of goods and service 1034.7 31.9 79.3 7.7 2336.9 16.9 330.5 14.1  
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
 
The Chinese current account surplus is one of the largest in the world relative to its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). It reflects exports of goods and services that amount to 41.4 
percent of GDP, while imports of goods and services are a huge, but smaller, 31.9 percent 
of GDP.  Both figures reflect the high degree of openness of Chinese trade.  The U.S. 
also is very open, with relatively large trade as a share of its GDP, though much smaller 
than China’s figures.  In the U.S., there is a large current account deficit of $738.6 billion 
in 2007, 5.3 percent of U.S. GDP.  The U.S. deficit actually was smaller in 2007 than in 
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2006, down from $811.5 billion or 6.1 percent of GDP.  This can also be seen in Chart 1, 
where the current account as a percent of GDP for 1982 to 2007 is shown.  The current 
account deficit in the U.S. is a reverse image of the surplus in China, though this largely 
reflects the persistence and growth of each balance over the period.   
 
Chart 1 
China’s and U.S. current account imbalances 
The most notorious imbalances are in the current account
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Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
  
It is this similarity that attracts so much popular interest in both countries, with U.S. 
critics pointing out that there is a strong link between these two balances and that the U.S. 
deficit may even be caused by the trade and exchange rate policies that, in their view, 
hold down the prices of Chinese goods, largely by fixing the yuan-dollar exchange rate, 
so that U.S. firms and consumers buy a relatively large amount of Chinese exports and 
export little of their relatively high-priced goods and services to China.  As evidence, 
critics point to a relatively large build-up of foreign exchange or official reserve assets in 
China, which they believe indicates the imbalance because the Chinese are willing to 
allow their central bank, the People’s Bank of China, to acquire this excess flow of 
dollars to China and hold it in very low interest U.S. government securities instead of 
allowing the yuan to appreciate, which would reduce China’s exports/U.S. imports and 
boost China’s imports/U.S. exports to restore balance, or at least move toward balance in 
each country’s current account balance.    
 
There are many errors in this analysis which render it false. The most basic problems are 
that trade is only one aspect of international transactions, so that attempts to intervene in 
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trade can have undesirable effects on capital flows and on the exchange rate, and, second, 
trade with one country is not the source of a nation’s overall trade imbalance.  The latter 
is influenced by the capital account and by other macroeconomic features of an 
economy.2  It is not the purpose here to explore these fallacies, but the data do suggest 
that U.S. and Chinese international trade relations are dominated by the other.  Table 1 
supports this view, especially for China, using data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis at the Department of Commerce.  The U.S. takes almost a quarter of China’s 
exports.  While U.S. exports only make up 7.7 percent of China’s imports, the U.S. 
current account deficit with China accounts for 77.9 percent of China’s surplus.  This 
sounds like the U.S. is China’s biggest customer and indeed the U.S. is China’s largest 
trading partner, its number one customer for its exports and the third largest supplier of 
China’s imports, behind Japan and South Korea, respectively.  
 
China trade does account for a significant share of the U.S. current account deficit.  In 
2007, the U.S. current account deficit with China was $289.7 billion, 39.2 percent of the 
overall U.S. current account deficit.  China accounts for only 14.1 percent of U.S.imports 
of goods and services and U.S. trade is more diversified.  China ranks second (10.3%) as 
the U.S.’ largest trading partner behind Canada (16.8%), barely edging out Mexico 
(9.8%).  Thus, while U.S. trade is very important to China, especially its share of China’s 
exports, these Chinese exports are a smaller share of U.S. imports of goods and services, 
because of the larger trade with neighbors and more diversified sources of trade. China’s 
leading trade partner, the U.S., accounts for 32.5 percent of China trade in goods and 
services, while the U.S.’ top trade partner, Canada, accounts for 16.8 percent of U.S. 
trade; China, accounts for 10.3 percent.    
 
II. The U.S. and China Capital Account Imbalance 
Table 2 shows the U.S. capital account in 2007.  It is included to provide the more 
detailed components of the capital flows discussed here.  First note that it is officially 
called the “financial” account and that there is, in fact, another account called the 
“capital” account. The real capital account in the official balance of payments statistics of 
countries is for movements of real capital items, particularly (gifts), of used equipment 
across borders.  It is typically very small.  The capital transactions of interest here are the 
acquisition or sales of financial assets, especially for direct investment abroad or for 
foreign direct investment, or portfolio investment in bonds and stocks, or in bank deposits 
or loans. These financial transactions are lumped together as capital inflows or outflows 
here and their net balance is referred to as the capital balance here. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 See Tatom (2007) for a discussion of some of the arguments over the US-China trade imbalance and the 
likely lack of justification and the ineffectiveness of bilateral exchange rate or trade policy actions in 
eliminating a multilateral imbalance.  Cheung, Chinn and Fujii (2008) provide supporting evidence that the 
Renminbi is not misaligned, so that efforts to force a currency appreciation are doomed to failure, as they 
did earlier (2007).  See also Bailey and Lawrence (2006). 
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Table 2 
U.S. International Capital and Financial Transactions   
[Millions of dollars]   
(Credits +; debits -) 2007
Capital account   
Capital account transactions, net -2317
Financial account   
U.S.-owned assets abroad, (increase/financial outflow (-)) 
-
1206332
  U.S. official reserve assets -122
    Gold 0
    Special drawing rights -154
    Reserve position in the International Monetary Fund 1021
    Foreign currencies -989
  U.S. Government assets, other than official reserve assets -22931
    U.S. credits and other long-term assets -2441
    Repayments on U.S. credits and other long-term assets 3450
    U.S. foreign currency holdings and U.S. short-term assets -23940
  U.S. private assets 
-
1183278
    Direct investment -335415
    Foreign securities -273851
    U.S. claims on unaffiliated foreigners reported by nonbanking concerns 15819
    U.S. claims reported by U.S. banks, not included elsewhere -589831
Foreign-owned assets in the United States, (increase/financial inflow (+)) 1863697
  Foreign official assets in the United States 412698
    U.S. Government securities 231852
      U.S. Treasury securities 49900
      Other 181952
    Other U.S. Government liabilities 5673
    U.S. liabilities reported by U.S. banks, not included elsewhere 108456
    Other foreign official assets 66717
  Other foreign assets in the United States 1450999
    Direct investment 204414
    U.S. Treasury securities 166301
    U.S. securities other than U.S. Treasury securities 391884
    U.S. currency 10937
    U.S. liabilities to unaffiliated foreigners reported by nonbanking concerns 166579
    U.S. liabilities reported by U.S. banks, not included elsewhere 510884
Statistical discrepancy  83590
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A second clarification is that the U.S. includes official reserve transactions, which 
include Federal Reserve Bank acquisition of securities abroad (debit) and foreign official 
assets acquired by foreign central banks (+), including the Peoples Bank of China.  Some 
countries do not include these in the financial account and, instead, account for these 
“below the line” as the financing item for any remaining balance of payments. In the data 
reported below, China and the International Monetary Fund do this. In the U.S. case, 
“official reserve assets” are typically small because the Federal Reserve does not engage 
in active management of its reserves, but foreign central banks do and they typically hold 
much of their foreign exchange in U.S. Treasury securities. These transactions are 
sometimes an important component of U.S. capital inflows; according to Table 2, foreign 
central banks acquired $412.7 billion of U.S. government securities or loans in 2007 with 
funds that flowed in to them from their economies sales of goods, services or other assets 
to other countries. 
 
U.S. capital and foreign exchange transactions 
The simplified table for the U.S. and China in 2007 is given in Table 3 based on this 
more detailed information. The table also shows the current account balance from Table 1 
in order to show the relationship to the capital account, and for China it shows the change 
in reserves, which are a large component of the overall capital inflow into the United 
States.  
 
Table 3 
U.S. and China have relatively large capital inflows and outflows 
U.S. and China Balance of Payments, 2007                                                                                                                    
(Billions of U.S. dollars) China % GDP U.S. share % of total U.S. %GDP China share% of total
Capital inflows $241.2 7.4% $1.9 0.4% $1863.7* 13.4% $235.6** 12.6%
Capital outflows 170.8 5.3     235.6** 137.9 1206.3 8.7 1.9 0.1
Capital balance 70.4 2.1 -233.7     657.4* 4.7 233.7 35.5
Current account balance 371.8 11.5 289.7 77.9 -738.6 -5.3 -289.7 39.2
Change in reserve assets 461.7 14.2
*Includes $412.7 bilion in foreign official assets
**Includes $461.7 in increase in China's official reserve assets
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and State Administration for Foreign Exchange 
 
Note that U.S. capital inflows of 13.4 percent of GDP exceed U.S. exports (Table 1) of 
11.8 percent of GDP.  Foreigners acquired more assets in the U.S. than they purchased of 
U.S. goods and services in 2007.  Capital inflows are sometimes a more important source 
of foreign exchange for the U.S. than exports of goods and services.  Capital outflows are 
also relatively large in the U.S., reflecting an interest of U.S. investors to diversify their 
asset holdings (Table 3).  The positive U.S capital account balance in Table 3 offsets the 
current account deficit, except for a statistical discrepancy.  
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Chart 2 
U.S. capital inflows and outflows are large and growing 
          
U.S.capital flows have accelerated since the early 1990s
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Source: International Monetary Fund 
 
One problem with the growing U.S. capital inflows is that an increasing share of inflows 
is due to foreign central banks acquiring U.S. government securities as an instrument for 
holding their growing foreign exchange holdings.  This is especially true for China, for 
example, which added $461.7 billion to its reserve assets in 2007 alone and has 
accumulated about $1.8 trillion in reserve assets.  If the U.S. capital inflow and surplus is 
due to foreigners financing the U.S. trade deficit, then the U.S. remains exposed to the 
potentially growing unwillingness of foreign monetary authorities to holding larger and 
larger amounts of relatively low-interest rate U.S. government securities.3   
 
Chart 3 shows private capital flows, excluding government and official reserve flows.  
The pattern of growing flows since the early 1980s and net surplus remains when these 
official reserve flows are excluded, but the totals are smaller and the balance even gets 
close to zero in 1995-96. But foreign holdings of U.S. assets as foreign exchange have 
been growing very rapidly and constitute a relatively large share of GDP.  
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Phillips (2008) suggests that the overall U.S. capital inflow is at risk because of concerns over future 
policy or simply the large indebtedness of the U.S. to the rest of the world. The diversification, liquidity, 
return and safety benefits to foreign investors in the U.S. are not written in stone and policy discussions and 
decisions over the past year raise doubts about the extent of those benefits in the future. The concentration 
of foreign exchange holding in a single increasingly risky name is more likely to be the tripwire for adverse 
global capital market developments. 
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Chart 3 
U.S. capital flow trends are similar without official reserve flows   
U.S. private capital flows, excluding offical reserve flows
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Source: International Monetary Fund 
 
The large size of these additions to reserves each year is a risk to the U.S. economy 
because these securities yield relatively low returns to foreign central banks and there is 
currency risk, especially in recent years that makes holding these dollar-denominated 
securities a poor return asset for many foreign central banks. The addition of these assets 
to foreign central bank balance sheets also has other adverse consequences abroad.  
Expanding central bank reserves also expands the monetary base and the domestic money 
stock, and this in turn creates higher inflation in the country. Because of these 
consequences, foreign central banks, especially the Peoples Bank of China, could reduce 
their holdings of dollar-denominated assets by refusing to acquire them or by substituting 
other foreign exchange assets for dollars. This could have a substantial effect on the value 
of the dollar and the level of U.S. interest rates, in the view of some analysts. However, 
simply switching the currency in which to hold reserves, would have little or no effect on 
the currency markets, according to most analyses. Suppose China did this, then the 
supply of currencies they acquire would fall relative to dollars in the rest of the world and 
this would put upward pressure on the value of the dollar elsewhere so that there would 
be little or no effect on the value of the dollar or U.S. interest rates overall.  
 
The other reaction of central banks acquiring what is viewed as excessive and perhaps 
increasingly risky dollar-denominated assets, ending the reserve accumulation in dollars 
or any other currency, would lead to an appreciation of the local currency vis-a-vis the 
dollar, with all the macroeconomic effects that this would have on the domestic country 
as well as on the U.S.  
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Chart 4 shows the annual increases in U.S. dollar-denominated official reserves and 
indicates that the share has reached unusually high proportions since 2003.  The previous 
record in 1970 was a period of unusual weakness in the value of the dollar and led to the 
breakdown of the dollar-based global fixed exchange rate system.  High levels in this 
decade have also been associated with dollar weakness.  This is a major imbalance from 
the U.S. perspective, at least so long as there is a risk that foreign accumulation of dollars 
at the recent pace is unsustainable and could end or reverse.  
 
Chart 4 
Foreign increase in U.S. dollar official reserves have been unusually 
large since 2003  
Net foreign increases of dollar foreign exchange have also been high for several years 
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Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
China’s capital and foreign exchange transactions 
In China, capital inflows and outflows are a larger share of GDP than in many countries.  
The capital inflows are especially large as foreign investors are attracted by the openness 
of trade and the attractive cost of resources relative to productivity in China.  Foreign 
direct investment in China in 2007 was $138.4 billion, more than half the total capital 
inflows.  This flow compares favorably with the U.S. total foreign direct investment of 
$204.4 billion, which is only about 11 percent of the total U.S. capital inflow that year.  
China’s attractiveness for foreign direct investment leads that of emerging markets and 
most of the world.   
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Chart 5 
China has strong capital flows, but outflows are relatively weak  
China has strong foreign investment inflows, but relatively low investment abroad
(in only seven of the past 26 years has investment abroad exceeded 1.5% of GDP)
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Source: International Monetary Fund and State Administration for Foreign Exchange 
 
The capital account balance typically mirrors the current account and is often the driving 
force determining the current account balance.  It is the overall balancing item in a 
country such as the United States, where there is little government or central bank 
intervention in the foreign exchange market and little or no attempt for any other reason 
to manage international reserves. Exchange rates are allowed to adjust so that the balance 
of payments balances without any required intervention by the Federal Reserve. The 
capital account balance is not the balancing item in a country like China, however.  
Indeed, the Chinese capital account balance usually shows a surplus, as seen in Chart 5. 
Thus the dollars that flow in to China to pay for exports are not fully used to purchase 
imports and those dollars are not used to buy foreign assets, on net,  either.  Instead the 
net dollar flow from trading goods and services is supplemented by the net dollar flow 
arising from the net flow of dollars to acquire China’s assets.  The key balancing item in 
the Chinese balance of payments is the official reserve assets, which reflect the rate of 
addition to official reserve assets. This is part of the fixed exchange rate system that 
China followed from 1994 to 2005 and a continuing component of exchange rate and 
monetary policy under the managed float policy followed since then.   
 
Rather than a capital account deficit, which would represent China’s net purchases of 
assets abroad, including acquisition of foreign currency balances in foreign bank 
accounts, China has a persistent capital account surplus.  This is the major “imbalance” in 
the capital account that can be identified in this paper, and it feeds or enlarges the third 
Chinese imbalance, the large and growing accumulation of reserve assets.  China’s 
balance of payments has the classical appearance of a “mercantilist” nation aiming to 
enrich itself by accumulating official reserve assets by exporting its goods, services and 
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capital to accumulate gold or other foreign exchange reserves.  The welfare losses 
associated with such policies date back at least to Adam Smith’s classic work (1776).    
 
The official reserve asset imbalance is shown in Chart 6, along with its principal sources, 
the current account and capital account balances; the other source of the change in 
foreign exchange reserves is “errors and omissions,” which is not shown.  China 
persistently accumulates foreign exchange, indeed it is an accelerating annual share of 
GDP despite rapid GDP growth. By the end of 2007, the People’s Bank of China held 
$1.5 trillion of foreign exchange, almost one-half year’s GDP, and growing rapidly.  
While the chart indicates that it is the accelerating current account balance that accounts 
for most of the explosive growth of reserves since 2004, the capital account also played a 
significant role over most of the past 25 years.   
 
Chart 6 
Chinese official reserve assets are accumulating at an accelerating rate 
Annual increases in China's reserve assets are large and accelerating 
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One perspective on the excessive level and growth of reserves is provided by a 
comparison of foreign exchange assets to the external spending of a nation.  Credit 
analysts often evaluate a country’s foreign exchange assets by comparing them to imports 
of goods and services; the standard criteria that a country has adequate reserves if they 
exceed three months or one quarter of a years imports. The indicator suggests that the 
country could pay for its imports for three months in a crisis in which it could not obtain 
credit or earn foreign exchange by exporting.  In China’s case, the nation could meet such 
a crisis and cover its imports of goods, services and assets for over a year. Chart 7 shows 
that China’s foreign exchange (the most liquid component of official reserves, so not 
including gold or other international reserve assets) have grown to exceed not only its 
annual imports of goods and services, so four times an adequate level, but more than its 
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purchases of goods, services and assets abroad.  At nearly 50 percent of GDP, China’s 
foreign exchange is the highest of all the nations in the world measured relative to GDP.     
 
Chart 7 
China’s foreign exchange reserves are large relative to its annual foreign 
expenditures 
China's foreign exchange reserves exceed its annual purchases of goods, services and 
assets
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The China-U.S. financial transaction connection 
Table 3 shows that U.S. investment in China plays a relatively minor role in China’s 
financial markets, but this understates the case to an extent.  U.S. direct investment in 
China in 2007 was $5.7 billion and banks loaned Chinese firms $3.4 billion, but other 
investors liquidated some $11.1 billion in security holdings in China. None of these 
figures alter the fact that U.S investment in China in 2007 was relatively minor for the 
Chinese or for American investors. Since 1999, U.S. direct investment in China has been 
5 percent or less of foreign investment in China, except in 2004 when it was 8.1 percent. 
Of course these small numbers are even smaller relative to U.S. GDP or overall U.S. 
direct investment or total investment abroad.   
  
Table 3 does suggest that capital outflows from China to the U.S. make up a significant 
share of China’s total outflows and of U.S. capital inflows, but this is completely 
misleading because the data are not comparable and hence the share is labeled as not 
comparable.  The reason, as noted earlier, is that the total outflow for China does not 
include acquisition of official reserves, primarily U.S. government securities, but the U.S. 
data do include this.  Excluding this $461.7 billion of reserve assets in 2007, suggests that 
the remainder of capital outflows were negative in 2007, or the Chinese liquidated other 
asset holdings abroad.  Both aspects of the data reinforce the problem noted above.  
China does not invest abroad, except to acquire U.S. government securities as reserve 
assets, and these purchases make up a huge share, actually more than all of the increased 
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holdings of all official foreign assets in the U.S. ($412.7 billion).  These inflows from 
China accounted for over 20 percent of all U.S. capital inflows in 2007 and brought total 
capital inflows from China up to 12.6 percent of all capital inflows to the U.S. 
 
In summary, the capital flow data indicate that U.S. capital flows to China are minor from 
the perspective of either country, most capital outflows from China, especially to the U.S. 
are relatively small, but that foreign exchange flows to China are substantial, both from 
the point of view of China’s international transactions or its GDP and relative to overall 
acquisition of U.S. government securities in the U. S. by the rest of the world, or relative 
to overall U.S. capital inflows.        
   
III. Potential Remedies 
The potential remedies for international transaction imbalances depend upon identifying 
the imbalances that are of concern. Commonly identified imbalances that have been 
examined here are the Chinese and U.S. trade imbalances, the excessive Chinese capital 
account balance and the foreign exchange level and growth in China. The second issue 
concerns the possibility of either country to unilaterally change these imbalances by 
actions directed at the other. A country’s transactions with the rest of the world are in part 
determined by its macroeconomic performance relative to the rest of the world, so that 
taking action to alter the economic relationship with one country simply results in 
substitutions of transactions with other nations. An example of this is the proposal of 
many U.S. critics of the outsized imports from China who believe that actions to push up 
the value of the yuan will reduce those imports, improve the U.S. trade balance and also 
reduce the pace of Chinese accumulation of U.S. government securities, thereby slowing 
growth of the Chinese money supply and reducing inflation.  It is the case that a 
government can intervene in the market for its currency and bring about a changing its 
value, at least within limits.  But such change would simply make it likely that the now 
more expensive Chinese goods would be replaced by cheaper imports from China’s 
competitors, especially other Asian producers in Indonesian, Vietnam, the Philippines 
and elsewhere. An appreciation of the yuan is not likely to have much effect on the U.S.  
trade imbalance; it would simply move it from China to other nations.    
 
An appreciation of the yuan against all currencies would reduce China’s trade surplus and 
could reduce pressures on foreign exchange reserve growth, money growth and inflation, 
but it would also disrupt production and employment at many domestic firms and, more 
importantly, it could produce a speculative surge in capital inflows and make the capital 
account, monetary policy and inflation problems worse, and create a potential for a future 
reversal of the capital flow and currency collapse reminiscent of the patterns associated 
with the 1997-98 Asian crisis.4  Concern for the avoidance of a surge in portfolio 
investment and subsequent outflow is probably the second main reason for China’s fixed 
exchange rate regime from 1994 until 2005.5  The principal reason was to provide a 
                                                 
4 Goldstein and Lardy (2008) argue that the Chinese have not appreciated their currency enough since the 
amount allowed so far has been accompanied by a growing current account surplus and an acceleration on 
foreign exchange growth.    
5 Capital controls typically apply to inflows, but putting restrictions on inflows or outflows reduce 
incentives for foreigners to invest in a country. Chilean restrictions on capital inflows outflows from 1991-
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monetary anchor for monetary policy and inflation.  Thus, a policy of appreciation of the 
yuan would have little effect on the U.S. trade imbalance and it could have serious 
adverse risks on the Chinese economy within a few years.   
 
There are several remedies that ultimately rely for their effectiveness on slowing the U.S. 
economy’s growth (slower import growth, improved relative prices for exports relative to 
imports, reduced rates of return to capital and foreign investment) or faster growth in 
China.  Countries do not consciously choose slower economic growth and countries 
growing at their capacity rates are not easily encouraged to pursue inflationary policies or 
policies that waste resources in order to gain some short-term output gain.  Countries  
sometimes do take up protectionist policies that indirectly slow growth and reduce 
current account deficits and capital account balances, but such actions damage domestic 
business and citizens, so have little to recommend them.   
 
The most obvious step that the Chinese could take is to open up the capital account.6 
Beginning in February 2007, current account transactions were liberalized so that 
Chinese businesses, both domestic and non-domestic, can freely move foreign exchange 
across the border for import or export purposes.  The same is not true for capital account 
transactions, especially capital outflows.7  Capital outflows are quite limited for Chinese 
households and investors.  That is a primary reason for the small capital outflows, even in 
recent years. Removing restrictions would reduce the net capital inflow and foreign 
exchange build-up in China dollar-for-dollar with each dollar increase in capital outflow, 
                                                                                                                                                 
98 were expected to insulate the country from the sudden stops of capital inflows associated with the 
financial crises in Asia.  Instead, the restrictions acted as a disincentive to invest in the country and the 
undesired fall in the capital account balance was accomplished by a surge in outflows instead of a decline 
in inflows.   See Forbes (2007) for evidence of how these restrictions also raised the cost of capital for 
smaller traded domestic firms and Gallego, Hernandez and Schmidt-Hebbel (2000) and Cowan and De 
Gregorio (2005) for overviews and lessons from the Chilean experience.    
6 Cappiello and Ferrucci (2008) focus on the importance of opening the capital account and moving toward 
a flexible exchange rate as sequenced steps to reduce the opportunity cost of a fixed exchange rate system.  
They do not single out the benefits of lifting capital outflow restrictions, however, which are emphasized 
here. People’s Bank of China Deputy Governor Xiang (2006) provides an excellent review of China’s 
financial sector and economic development and outlines the next steps to be taken.  He notes the 
importance of a harmonious relation between economic development and development of the financial 
sector.  He also points to the importance of developing internal financial markets and opening the sector to 
global competition.   
7 Chinese authorities have made recent changes in tax incentives for capital inflows that will reduce such 
investments, but these changes are strongly in the interest of promoting economic efficiency and equality 
and may actually boost the attractiveness of investing in China. Earlier, in order to promote direct 
investment, tax incentives were given that lowered the income tax rate paid by foreign firms. These may 
have been successful in priming the pump for foreign investment, but they misallocated capital and other 
resources within the economy.  Ending those subsides will improve the integrity of the tax system and of 
economic policy, even if they have a slight negative effect on capital inflows. Unfortunately, regulators 
have offset the benefits of these steps by tightening restrictions on majority or even minority ownership of 
foreign acquisitions in the financial services industry and by regulatory delays in approving such 
acquisitions. Regulators have also cracked down on capital inflows that have come from inflated invoicing 
of exports, forcing more rapid and exact documentation to convert dollar receipts into renminbi. Making 
foreign investment subject to changing and arbitrary rules, as well as limiting the potential for control of 
domestic financial firms severely diminishes the attraction of investing in China.       
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probably turning net inflows into net outflows.  Such a reduction in the foreign exchange 
build-up would reduce asset growth at the People’s Bank of China, and the associated 
pressure on the money supply and inflation.   
 
Under current Chinese monetary and financial policy, the People’s Bank of China has 
attempted to insulate monetary growth from the increase in foreign exchange by raising 
reserve requirements at banks.  In effect, the People’s Bank increased bank reserves by 
buying up the dollars coming into the country and then raised reserve requirements so 
that banks would have to hold these reserves instead of being able to lend them out, 
expanding credit and deposits. Of course, the reserve requirement increases were not 
fully offsetting so that money, credit and inflation have accelerated in the past several 
years despite these efforts.  Reserve requirements at large Chinese banks have been raised 
steadily since July 2006 when the reserve ratio was 8 percent, to more than double that 
burden, 17.5 percent in June 2007.  Such increases substantially affect the cost, 
efficiency, competitiveness and profitability of domestic banks.  For every yuan of 
deposits, banks now must hold 0.175 yuan in non-interest-bearing reserves and are able 
to cover the interest and other costs of these deposits by lending out the remaining 0.825 
yuan.  These increases in reserve requirements have left Chinese banks with reserve 
requirement costs that are among the highest in the world, despite a global trend toward 
reducing or eliminating reserve requirements in order to boost international 
competitiveness among banks. 
 
Associated with the restrictions on financial markets, Chinese monetary authorities also 
limit the interest rates that banks can pay depositors and that they can charge on loans.  In 
April 2006, before the central bank began to attempt to restrain the growth of money and 
credit, banks could pay 2.25 percent on deposits and could not charge more than 5.31 
percent on loans. Both of these rates were higher than the 1.2 percent inflation rate over 
the previous year. As reserve requirements rose, reducing banks spreads or margins on 
loans, and as inflation rose, monetary authorities raised both rates, but raised deposit rates 
by less and both rates by less than inflation rose.  By December 2007, the lending rate 
had been raised to 7.47 percent, while the rate paid to depositors had risen to 4.14 
percent, with the latter substantially below the inflation rate of 6.5 percent. Inflation 
accelerated in 2008, further reducing the negative real rate earned by depositors and 
reducing the real lending rate to negative territory. Banks lost profitability due to these 
changes, and depositors lose as well.  If borrowers can obtain credit, they face negative 
real interest rates, but in a regulated environment such as this one, interest rates cannot be 
used to allocate credit and so scarce credit does not go to its highest valued social use. 
 
In this environment, harmonious workings of financial markets become less likely. 
Savers are exploited by a financial system that offers negative returns and no access to 
higher yield opportunities domestically or abroad, firms face credit rationed by criteria 
other than interest rates or profitability of the use of scarce credit and banks are caught in 
the middle, earning lower returns and higher costs than their competitors abroad or other 
domestic business.  The inefficiencies and waste of resources that are created by all of 
these regulations and inflation have been characterized as repressed financial markets and 
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such markets are a major obstacle to growth.8 Lifting restrictions on capital outflows 
would end the circumstances (growth of foreign exchange reserves, money, credit and 
inflation) that have given rise to the more extensive repression of financial markets in 
China.   
 
Allowing greater freedom for domestic investors to diversify wealth portfolios by 
investing abroad would reduce the problems that Chinese imbalances create for China.  It 
would push the capital account balance toward deficit. It would also reduce the size and 
growth of China’s huge holding of foreign exchange in low return U.S. government 
securities.  It would also raise returns on Chinese wealth, reduce risk, improve the 
financial system and ease the pressures on the exchange rate, monetary policy and 
inflation.  Increasing Chinese private capital outflows would also switch the 
accumulation of foreign exchange assets in the U.S. to private financial assets. In one 
sense this is simply switching the composition of assets from U.S. government securities 
to stocks, bonds, and bank deposits in the U.S. However, this diversification benefits the 
U.S. by reducing the concentration of exposures to China.  It also would put upward 
pressure on the U.S. dollar because the asset demands of China would be desired 
portfolio or direct investments instead of residual purchases arising from excessive dollar 
flows into China.      
 
Capital outflows from a country are aimed at improving the rate of return on domestic 
wealth and/or reducing risk of these returns, sometimes simply through diversification, or 
from relatively attractive profit opportunities. Domestic business can expand markets and 
access to foreign resources through direct investment abroad.  Exposure to foreign 
markets increases productivity of domestic firms because of exposure to more demanding 
and more diverse markets abroad and because of new knowledge and capabilities of 
foreign technology and resources. In the case of the domestic financial market, 
international capital outflows provide significant competition, providing opportunities for 
upgrading productivity, rates of return and risk reduction through better products or better 
processes for management of domestic resources.  Outflows of capital for foreign 
portfolio investment are imports of capital and act in much the same way as imports of 
goods and services in terms of influencing competitive pressures, offering new products 
and technologies and new ideas of how to better serve domestic financial customers.   
 
One of the biggest development problems facing China is upgrading its financial system 
and making it globally competitive.9 China’s outstanding growth record   
stands in marked contrast to its largely state-owned, failed financial institutions.  While 
most analysts argue that China is the exception, it is not.  The same arguments have been 
made in other more open Asian economies (see Rohwer 1998); the evidence suggests that 
                                                 
8 See Beim and Calomiris (2001) for an extended discussion of the conditions and effects of repressed 
financial markets.   
9 Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2008b) provide a detailed review of the literature on the finance-growth 
linkage and they provide new evidence that government policies have significant effects on the operations 
of the financial system and on access to financial services by large segments of the population. Their 
review shows that “The services provided by the financial system exert a first-order impact on long-run 
economic growth.” (p. 2).   
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Asian growth success has come despite the backward financial markets, which held back 
even greater growth.10  Chinese government recapitalization of large banks in recent 
years yielded well-capitalized state-majority owned banking firms, but without directly 
addressing the incentive problems of state-owned companies and the institutional 
framework that led to the predominance of policy lending by domestic banks and the 
pattern of insolvent banks.  China has entered a brief window of opportunity in which to 
make the banking system efficient and competitive before the earlier problems of 
insolvency and inefficiency return.  Increased competition from internationally 
competitive banks is the most direct route to achieving the desired high quality, 
sustainably profitable financial institutions.11  
 
China has a captive financial market because of restrictions on capital outflows.  
Investors have essentially three options for unusually high saving: saving at highly 
regulated banks at extremely low rates of interest or investing in their own proprietary 
firms, or investing in asset accumulation at home, especially in housing, but again 
restrictions on financing put this option out of the reach of typical households.  Investing 
in entrepreneurial activity is the most risky option, but given the incredibly low rate of 
interest payable at banks, this is an attractive option.  Even before the explosion of 
foreign exchange, money, credit and inflation, and the consequent steps to offset some of 
these problems by reserve requirement changes detailed above, onerous restrictions on 
bank pricing created political and business incentives that restrained the growth of vibrant 
and competitive financial markets.  Opening capital outflows would create new wealth 
creation opportunities for investors, banks, business, and government, and it would create 
strong pressures from all of these groups, especially banks initially damaged by enhanced 
competition, to reduce excessive regulation of banks and to develop a profitable and 
competitive sector.  By enhancing the performance of the financial system, such a policy 
would reduce inequality and reduce poverty.12 
 
There has been some progress on this front, especially for direct investment. But the few 
notable steps prove that these are exceptional.  In 2008, the most prominent direct 
outflows from China to the U.S. have been the approval of New York branches for China 
Construction Bank and, on August 5, 2008, for the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China.  The latter is the biggest bank in China and it is 74.8 percent owned by the 
People’s Republic of China.  China Aluminum Company (Chinalco) acquired almost 15 
percent of Rio Tinto, the Australian mining firm, in February 2008 for almost $15 billion 
                                                 
10Some analysts argue that Asia, or at least China, is the exception to the rule that the quality of financial 
institutions is a critical determinant of economic growth and development.  Maksimovic, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Ayyagari (2008) find evidence that formal financial institution finance is associated with faster firm 
growth, but funds raised from alternative channels is not.  Moreover, they find that this result is not due to 
the selection process for firms that have access to formal financial institutions.  
11 Porter (1998) emphasized the role of competition in open goods markets for upgrading the 
competitiveness of domestic enterprise and boosting economic growth.  In the case of financial services 
firms, such improved competitiveness will arise through the import of capital from abroad.   
12 Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2008a) provide evidence that the more developed the financial system is the 
lower is income inequality and poverty and the greater is access by low income households to financial 
services.    
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and proposed to acquire 11 percent more in August 2008.  Haier was rumored in the 
financial press to be acquiring GE’s small appliance division and Lenovo is rumored to 
be acquiring the remainder of IBM’s consumer products division. 
 
 Earlier notable Chinese investments in the U.S. include Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s 
laptop business, Haier’s opening of a U.S. headquarters and sales operation for small 
consumer appliances, and, until its July 2008 sale to its partner Cleveland Clifts, United 
Mining Company’s, a subsidiary of Chinese steelmaker Laiwu,  30 percent owneship of 
United Taconite.  In Indiana, China International Marine Containers (Group) Co. Limited 
(CIMC) owns Vanguard National Trailer Corporation, the fastest growing trailer 
manufacturer in North America; the company is located in Monon, Indiana. Of course 
there are other Chinese companies in the U.S., but the list is not long.  In one sense, it is 
very impressive that there is direct investment from China in the U.S.; other emerging 
markets are more focused on developing their own business sector and do not expect to 
have profitable opportunities from expanding abroad. 
 
The greater opportunity for deregulation of the capital account would come from 
allowing investors to access financial assets abroad, either directly or through lifting of 
restrictions on Chinese financial firms offerings of foreign financial assets. In August 
2007, China surprised markets by allowing private citizens open access to investment in 
the Hong Kong equity market.  This had a large impact on outflows from the mainland to 
the Special Administrative Region. This action, referred to as the “through train” policy, 
was halted in November 2007, but not before Hong Kong’s Hang Seng index rose 55 
percent.  It is unclear when this outlet will resume. But full liberalization would likely 
make a huge dent in China’s stock of international reserves over time and it would ease 
pressures on the yuan, the U.S. dollar, China’s inflation and risks to the international 
financial system. Moreover, allowing full access to foreign assets through mainland firms  
would greatly boost the banking system’s competition and lead more directly to 
improvement in the competitiveness of China’s financial industry.      
 
IV. Summary and Conclusions 
 China and the U.S. have been at the heart of global discussions of international 
imbalances in economic relations.  China has three major imbalances: a trade surplus, a 
capital account surplus and a large annual build-up, and very high level, of international 
reserves.  The U.S. is widely criticized for having a comparable trade deficit that mirrors, 
to a large extent, China’s surplus. Moreover, foreign central banks, with the People’s 
Bank of China being the leader, have a large annual growth in holdings of U.S. 
government securities, which they hold as foreign exchange reserves.  The U.S. has a 
strong positive balance in its capital account, representing the strong attraction of the U.S. 
as an investment destination, even when foreign central bank acquisitions of U.S. 
government securities are excluded.  In large part, the attention to the bilateral relations 
of the U.S. and China are due to the central role that the dollar has played in China’s 
exchange rate system; the renminbi was pegged to the U.S. dollar as the anchor for 
Chinese monetary policy from 1994 to 2005 and has remained the key currency in its 
managed float since then.  But the other reason for attention to this bilateral relation is 
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political and business concern that China’s exports are responsible for U.S. imports and 
for the trade imbalances in both countries.  
 
Capital flows, especially flows of U.S. government securities, are also important in 
assessing the bilateral and overall imbalances in transactions for China and the U.S.  
What stands out here is that China has a capital account surplus to go along with its 
current account surplus, reinforcing its accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, 
mainly U.S dollar-denominated assets.  This is unusual for several reasons. Most 
important is that countries with large current account surpluses usually run deficits in 
their capital accounts, as excess foreign exchange that are not used to buy imports are 
used to purchase, on net, assets abroad.  For example, Switzerland, which exports more 
relative to GDP and has a larger current account balance on this basis, runs a 
corresponding deficit in its capital account as relatively large domestic saving, capital 
inflows and large foreign exchange inflows on its current account are used to acquire 
assets abroad for its domestic and international investors.  The reverse offsetting 
balance—a current account deficit and capital account surplus—observed in the U.S. 
It should be noted that this is a more “normal” pattern for a rapidly growing merging 
market economy--a current account deficit and a capital surplus, because such countries 
demand superior quality foreign resources, materials and capital goods to expand 
capacity and hence they have current account deficits, and they also offer global investors 
relatively high rates of return so that the country will attract net foreign investment from 
abroad.  Some of China’s major competitors had such a pattern before the Asian crisis in 
1997-98, but their increased sensitivity to a reversal of capital inflows has led them to 
pursue slower growth and to run surpluses in trade and continuing outflows of capital, on 
net. China’s special circumstances have allowed the authorities to indulge an even 
stronger sense of security by building reserves that even some of their Asian competitors 
could not afford.   
 
There are significant consequences of the Chinese and the U.S. imbalances.  In the U.S.’ 
case, there is political pressure for protectionism and for China to implement wasteful 
economic policies to reduce their surpluses and to reduce their exports to the U.S.  The 
expansion of foreign holding of dollar foreign exchange has raised the risk of U.S. 
exposure to foreign central banks and financial market shocks abroad.  The U.S. problem, 
perhaps because of its more decentralized trade and financial system, is already adjusting 
to these imbalances as the current account deficit began to decline in 2005 and the dollar 
has fallen dramatically, on average, against all trading partners.  Unfortunately, a good 
part of these adverse developments have, and will in the future, come from political 
pressures to raise taxes, especially on income from capital resources and from more 
protectionist policies, both of which are slowing growth in the U.S.   
 
In China’s case, the worst consequences of imbalances have been the results of the build-
up of large, low-return foreign exchange that has actually had negative returns since the 
managed float began in 2005.  These reserves have led to rapid growth in money and 
credit and, in turn, to a sharp acceleration in inflation, something that China had 
assiduously avoided since 1994 and that has raised serious doubts about the credibility of 
the monetary authorities and damaged their inflation-fighting reputation.  Moreover, 
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efforts to offset money growth and inflation have exposed and deepened existing 
inefficiencies in the financial system, which China had hoped to begin remedying by its 
efforts to recapitalize and list its banks’ equities on stock exchanges. 
 
China could attempt to eliminate these imbalances by restricting its openness or 
subsidizing imports, but such policies would reduce growth.  Ironically, Chinese 
policymakers could boost growth and aim to increase consumer and business demand for 
imports, but this too would lead to costly resource misallocations and would be 
challenged by greater foreign investment inflows.  China could also try to limit capital 
inflows, but this would restrict the ability to import technology, organizational and other 
human capital that accompanies foreign investment. Limiting portfolio inflows would 
reduce the efficiency and liquidity of financial markets, raising the cost of scarce capital 
resources.   
 
The most obvious solution proposed here is to lift restrictions on capital outflows, 
allowing households and business to diversify their wealth holdings to realize higher 
returns and/or less volatility in their own income and wealth.  This would soak up excess 
foreign exchange and transform future asset growth from massive central bank holdings 
of U.S. government securities to holdings of more attractive assets in the U.S. or 
elsewhere.  Such a step would eliminate the pressures on the People’s Bank of China, 
allowing for more rapid deregulation of banks, slower money and credit growth and 
slower inflation.        
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